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Two facts motivate this study. (1) The United States is the world’s most productive 
economy. (2) The US is the destination for a broad range of net factor inflows: unskilled 
labor, skilled labor, and capital. Indeed, these two facts may be strongly related: All 
factors seek to enter the US because of the US technological superiority. The literature on 
international factor flows rarely links these two phenomena, instead considering one-at-a-
time analyses that stress issues of relative factor abundance. This is unfortunate, since the 
welfare calculations differ markedly. In a simple Ricardian framework, a country that 
experiences immigration of factors motivated by technological differences always loses 
from this migration relative to a free trade baseline, while the other country gains. We 
provide simple calculations suggesting that the magnitude of the losses for US natives 
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Technological Superiority and the Losses From Migration 
 
I. Technology, Factor Flows, and Income Losses 
 Arguably the distinctive feature of the United States economy in a global context 
is the high level of its technology. Whether measured in the aggregate or at the level of 
the industry, US technology frequently figures as the most productive in the world, often 
by a considerable margin. This productivity, naturally, not only delivers high income to 
natives of the United States, but also influences decisions over the international flow of 
productive factors to the US economy.  
 A striking fact is the breadth of productive factors with net inflows to the United 
States. One might expect, on simple factor abundance grounds, that unskilled labor might 
find advantage in entering the United States. And so it does. Yet highly skilled labor also 
finds it advantageous to enter the United States. And the US has been a net capital 
importer for decades.1 One imagines that if land were free to migrate, a great deal of it 
might seek to move to the US as well. 
 The study of these international factor flows is almost always considered case by 
case. There are very good reasons for doing so, since the relevant agents, objectives and 
constraints vary considerably across these problems. However, the remarkable fact that 
such a broad array of productive resources desires to locate in the United States suggests 
that the logic is deeper than may be captured in the one-at-a-time approaches.  
 The superiority of US technology provides a parsimonious and plausible 
hypothesis to account for the attraction of the US location to such a broad array of 
factors. However, it is important to recognize that when factor movements are motivated 
                                                 
1 For all the talk of the “twin deficits,” net capital inflows continued into the United States even as the US 
government budget moved into surplus in the late 1990s. 
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by technological differences, both the positive and normative dimensions of these flows 
may differ significantly from more conventional approaches. 
 The conventional approach considers discrete inflows of a single factor to an 
economy. It then calculates an immigration surplus as the economy moves down the 
marginal product curve for the migrant factor. Much of the discussion concerns the 
magnitude of this surplus and whether fiscal considerations offset or reverse the sign of 
the net surplus.2  
 The conventional approach does not always make explicit the origins of factor 
price differences that motivate migration. When these are made explicit, the basis is 
usually differences in relative factor abundance. However, this immediately runs into a 
problem. In such a framework, if one factor receives a higher return in the US economy 
(say unskilled labor), then some other factor (e.g. skilled labor) must receive less – so 
want to leave the US economy. This is at odds with the observation that all factors seek to 
enter the US.  
This puzzle has an obvious fix. This is to allow international productivity 
differences that lead all factors to be more productive in the US, and so lead all factors to 
desire to enter such a highly productive economy.3 As a first pass of analysis, this 
suggests some economy from treating the multiple factors as a single composite factor. 
And this leads directly to a variant of the standard Ricardian trade model, now amended 
to allow for migration, as a setting in which to examine the consequences for a country of 
immigration when this is motivated by technological advantage. 
                                                 
2 For example, see Borjas (1995), Figure 1; Lalonde and Topel (1997), Figure 1; or Razin and Sadka (2001) 
Figure 1. 
3 Indeed, recent research by Lutz Hendricks (2002) strongly supports the hypothesis that national TFP 
differences matter for the wage differences motivating labor migration. 
 4 
 The key analytic insight can be stated simply. When immigration is motivated by 
technological advantages, natives in the country that receives immigrants always lose 
relative to a baseline with free trade. This is very much at odds with the presumption in 
the literature that considers inflows one factor at a time. Nonetheless, the logic of the 
result is quite simple. Even in autarky, a country enjoys the fruits of its own highly 
productive technology. When the country opens to trade, having a monopoly on its own 
technology is a crucial element of comparative advantage and gives rise to gains for this 
economy. Immigration, in this context, amounts to an erosion of this monopoly power. 
Although immigration motivated by technological advantage shifts out the world 
production opportunities set, the country experiencing the immigration always loses. 
Trade arising due to technological differences is a source of mutual gain. However, when 
free trade is in place, migration due to technological differences is not a source of mutual 
gain. World income rises, but more than all of this is captured by natives of the country 
of emigration. Natives of the country experiencing immigration lose. 
 Given the simplicity of these analytic results, and the plausibility of the 
underlying assumptions, it is surprising that this approach has previously figured almost 
not at all in the discussions of factor flows. Although the Ricardian model is nearly 
always the first model of trade that we teach students, it is almost never used to discuss 
migration issues. We have found only two references. Findlay (1982) discusses the 
possibility of native losses from migration in a paper on “International Distributive 
Justice,” and Daniel Trefler (1997) does likewise amidst a catalog of models that might 
be used to think about these issues. Both solve the model and recognize that immigration 
creates a loss for the receiving country. We go beyond their work in several respects. The 
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first is simply to grasp that coordinated inflows of a wide range of productive factors – 
unskilled labor, skilled labor, and capital – would make an interpretation of “labor” in the 
Ricardian model as a composite factor quite reasonable. The second is to see that this is 
in fact a good description of the US experience in recent decades. The third is to use these 
insights to develop empirical applications that allow us to quantify the losses for US 
natives.4 
Trade theorists have a long tradition of discussing the possibility of losses from 
factor accumulation or international factor movements, as in Jagdish N. Bhagwati (1958), 
Bhagwati and Richard A. Brecher (1981), or Gene M. Grossman (1984). Even a graduate 
textbook treatment of the interaction of trade and factor mobility has been developed in 
Kar-Yiu Wong (1995). Yet there seems not to have been a recognition in the field that the 
Ricardian model might be the right framework for thinking about the consequences of 
such factor inflows to the US economy. This might reflect the availability of what appear 
to be more general models of factor flows, a tendency to think about these flows one at a 
time, and the fact that until recently empirical analysis played a relatively small role in 
the field.5 
                                                 
4 Trefler (1997, p. 11) seems to have on his mind only inflows of low-skilled labor, writing “Since 
immigrant and native labor compete head on for the same jobs at the same wages, the home country can 
only absorb the immigrants in low productivity industries that spring up in response to immigration. One 
should think of these industries as garments or citrus fruit which would disappear in the absence of migrant 
workers.” By contrast, we think of the inflow of a broad range of factors as potentially expanding output in 
many or all sectors. 
 
5 One early empirical paper is by Bob Hamilton and John Whalley (1984). They work in a framework in 
which capital is fixed nationally, all countries produce the same homogeneous product, and there are 
diminishing returns to labor. They then consider the consequences of freeing all labor to migrate 
internationally. Unlike Borjas (1995), they are principally concerned with the consequences for world 
output of fully free international migration rather than focused primarily on the magnitude of the 
immigration surplus for the North. 
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 Empirical consideration of the international movement of labor has attracted some 
of the top talent among labor economists. This includes outstanding work by Borjas 
(1995, 2001), who is one of the first to take seriously the task of quantifying the 
aggregate impact of immigration on US income. It also includes a wealth of work 
surveyed by Lalonde and Topel (1997) and Friedberg and Hunt (1995). There are two 
factors that have tended to distract labor economists from the results we highlight. The 
first is simply that they have focused on labor flows, not all factor flows.6 The second is 
that distinct methodological traditions have acted as barriers between the labor 
economists who have thought hardest about the empirics and the theoretical traditions in 
international trade that are a key part of the approach developed here. In any case, the 
labor economists must be given great credit for being the first to quantify the impact of 
labor flows.  
 Finally, those who think about international capital flows have likewise neglected 
the issue. The classic model of MacDougall (1960) on the consequences of capital 
inflows delivers precisely the type of “immigration surplus” featured in the labor 
literature, in this case with capital inflows taking the place of labor inflows. Again, one 
reason for neglect of the issues we raise is specialization by field, so that those 
economists who think about capital flows rarely concern themselves with labor flows.7  
                                                 
6 In this case, the exceptions tend to prove the rule. For example, Lalonde and Topel (1997) do briefly 
discuss what would happen if capital moved into the US in the same proportion as labor, but conclude that 
it would then leave incomes unchanged due to constant returns to scale, ignoring the possibility of terms of 
trade losses that we identify. 
7 A rare exception is Razin and Sadka (2001), who do discuss both Labor and Capital Flows. Nonetheless, 
having taken advantage of the symmetry of the problems in analytics when considered one at a time, they 
then move to discuss the issues wholly separately. 
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 In sum, our approach to analyzing these factor flows seems not to have been 
carried out previously in large part because the analytic and methodological elements key 
to these effects have been divided across fields that have too little communication. 
 This paper sets out a simple framework for exploring these issues. Section II 
considers the gains and losses from immigration within the classic model of Dornbusch, 
Fischer, and Samuelson (1977). Section III extends this to consider the case in which 
labor quality differs across countries. Section IV establishes our rationale for using the 
Ricardian model as a framework for analyzing factor immigration to the US, 
documenting the dimensions and magnitude of US technological superiority and of the 
inflows themselves. Section V provides empirical exercises that establish baseline 
quantification of the losses to US natives of these factor inflows. These exercises build 
most importantly on Acemoglu and Ventura (2002) and on Harrigan (1997). We also 
consider some robustness checks. Section VI concludes. 
 
II. Migration in the Dornbusch-Fischer-Samuelson Model 
 We consider a world with two countries, home and foreign (with foreign variables 
indicated by an asterisk). The world labor force WL  is fixed and distributed among the 
home and foreign countries so that: 
(1) * WL L L+ =   
For the moment, we assume there are no possibilities of migration.  
There exists a continuum of goods indexed by [ ]0,1z∈ . Let output of z at home 
be ( )y z  and output of z  abroad be *( )y z . Then the corresponding production functions 
are: 
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(2) ( ) ( ) ( )y z A z L z=   
(3) * * *( ) ( ) ( )y z A z L z=   
*( ) and ( )A z A z  are the respective productivities, assumed to reflect a national 
technological level. We order the goods according to decreasing degree of home 
comparative advantage and for simplicity assume this ordering is strict. Hence  
(4) * *
( ) ( )If , then 
( ) ( )
A z A zz z
A z A z
′′< > ′   
Goods and factor markets are perfectly competitive. Free entry excludes the possibility of 
economic profits, so that for any good z, the wage equals the value marginal product in 
the market where it is produced: 
(5) * *
( ) ( ) if  is produced at home.
( ) ( ) if  is produced in foreign.
w A z p z z
w A z p z z
=
=   
 
For any good z, the relative productivities in the goods establish the relative wage at 
which the good could be competitively produced in both countries. This defines a 
functional relation over z between relative wages and relative productivities that is 
derived by taking the ratio of the equations in (5). We assume the goods are traded freely, 






ρ ≡   
Note that ( ) 0zρ′ < , indicating decreasing home comparative advantage. 
 If we knew the equilibrium relative wage *
w
w
 then we could identify which goods 
are produced in which country. Suppose for a moment that the equilibrium relative wage 
is such that some good z  can be profitably produced in both locations. Then, since 
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home’s comparative advantage is strongest in low index goods, it must be the case that 






>   
 
Correspondingly, since foreign’s comparative advantage is strongest in high index goods, 






<   
 
Equations (7) and (8) will be very important when we derive the welfare consequences of 
migration. But first we show how the equilibrium relative wage is established. 
 We assume that consumers in each country have identical log linear preferences, 
so that expenditure shares on each good are fixed and common across countries. Let this 
share for good z  be given by ( )b z . We require that 
1
0
( ) 1b z dz =∫ . We can also define the 
share of spending on goods in the range [ ]0, z  to be given by: 
(9) 
0
( ) ( )
z
z b z dzθ ′ ′= ∫   
This allows us to define a market clearing equation. Assume for a moment that good z 
defines a boundary between goods produced at home (low index goods in which home 
has comparative advantage) and those produced abroad. Then ( )zθ is the share of 
consumer spending falling on goods produced in the home country. Home and foreign 
income (hence spending) are * * and wL w L  respectively. Here market clearing can be 
expressed as a balanced trade condition: 
(10) [ ] * *1 ( ) ( )z wL z w Lθ θ− =   
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ω ≡ , and the 






θω θ≡ −   
Note that ( ) 0zω′ > . 
 The relations ( ) and ( )z zρ ω  can be plotted in the space of relative wages and z. 
Their intersection defines the boundary good z  and share of spending on products 
produced in the home country ( )zθ  consistent with trade according to comparative 
advantage and market clearing. Absent migration, this determines equilibrium, as in 
Figure 1. 
 We now turn to consider the equilibrium when costless migration is allowed in 
addition to trade. The first observation is that costless migration will insure that inferior 
technologies are never employed. Production will be according to absolute advantage. 
Moreover, labor moves to equate wages. By equation (11), adjustment in the distribution 
of the world labor force across countries will shift ( )zω  to achieve equal wages.  
 It is worth pausing for a moment to note that allowing labor to migrate freely 
expands the feasible world production set any time, as here, that technologies across 
countries are not identical. With perfect competition in all markets and an expanded 
feasible world production set, we can be assured that world income will go up with the 
possibility of migration. 
 This framework gives us two cases to consider. The first is one in which each 
country has an absolute advantage in an interval of goods. This is depicted in Figure 2, 
and without loss of generality, we assume that the initial distribution of world labor led 
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country 1 to have a higher relative wage. Then enough foreign labor moves to the home 
economy to insure that ( )zω  and ( )zρ  cross where the wages are equated. 
 The key question to resolve is who gains or loses from this migration. Note that 
with an expanded world income, it is feasible for both to gain. If lump sum taxes were 
available and employed, both could gain again. Since such taxes are in practice infeasible 
either administratively or politically, we look only at gains and losses through the market.  
 In the Ricardian framework, it is convenient to derive a real wage separately in 
terms of the price of typical goods produced at home and abroad. These allow us to make 
the appropriate inferences about welfare. 
 For a good produced at home, equation (5) tells us that the wage equals the value 
marginal product, or ( ) ( )w p z A z= . It is very useful to rearrange this to define a real 
wage in terms of such a good: 
(12) ( )  if  is produced at home.
( )
w A z z
p z
=   
That is, the real wage in terms of z for a good produced at home is just given by the home 
productivity in z. Moreover, since producing a good oneself is always an option, the 
home productivity ( )A z  is also a lower bound on the home real wage in terms of this 
good.  
If a good z is produced abroad, then * *( ) ( )w p z A z= . The home real wage in 
terms of such a good is:  
(13) ** ( )  if  is produced in foreign.( )
w w A z z
p z w
 =      
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Equation (13) reveals that for a good produced in foreign, the home real wage depends on 
the factoral terms of trade, *
w
w
, and the foreign productivity *( )A z . 
The pattern of production and trade in the Ricardian model depends on a 
comparison of relative productivities and relative wages. From equation (7) above, a 





> . In the reverse case it will be 
produced in foreign. It is convenient to rearrange this equation to link the pattern of 
production and trade to the real wages for the respective goods. Multiplying through, we 
have that a good is produced at home just in case: 
(14) **( ) ( )
wA z A z
w
>   
These terms compare precisely the real wages developed in equations (12) and (13) 
above. That is, a good is produced at home just when the real product wage offered there 
exceeds that available through trade.  
 This also makes it very easy to understand the impact of migration on home real 









= . With 
inflows of labor to the home economy, we showed above that the range of goods 
produced at home expands. Hence there are at most three types of goods. 
(i) If good z is produced at home before and after migration, then  




=   
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(ii) If good z is initially produced in foreign, but switches to home after the 
migration, and recalling that A(z) is a lower bound for a home product wage, 
 0*
0
 falls from *( ) to ( ).
( )
ww A z A z
p z w
  









≡ ,  
 0*
0
 falls from *( ) to *( ).
( )
ww A z A z
p z w
  
 In short, the home country that experiences immigration loses for sure. Its wage is 
unchanged in terms of the type (i) goods that it produced both before and after migration. 
But its real wage falls in terms of both type (ii) and type (iii) goods, those newly 
produced in home due to the migration and those goods produced by the foreign workers 
who remain in foreign. 
 The foreign country that provides the immigrants gains for sure. The simplest way 
to see this is simply to recall that migration leads world income to rise and this must 
accrue to someone. If the home labor lost, it must be because the foreign labor reaped 
more than all of the world income gains. We could also do the good-by-good analysis as 
before. This would reveal that foreign labor neither gains nor loses in terms of the type 
(iii) goods it produced before and after. Yet it experienced real income gains in terms of 
both goods that it previously imported and those newly produced in the home country. 
 Having considered the case in which each country had technical superiority in an 
interval of goods, we now can very easily analyze the case in which one country (say 
home) has technological superiority in all goods. When migration is not possible, the two 
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countries trade according to comparative advantage. When migration is possible, the 
inferior foreign technologies simply cease to be employed. Again, we could analyze the 
movement of wages in terms of the prices of goods initially produced in each of the two 
countries. However, a shortcut provides the desired answers more quickly. 
 Note that when foreign labor has access to the superior home technology, the 
relative prices of all goods are determined simply by the relative productivities of home 
technology, exactly as in the home autarky equilibrium. In fact the equilibrium with 
migration effectively returns home labor to the autarky equilibrium. Since home labor 
initially enjoyed gains from trading with the foreign country due to comparative 
advantage, this return to effective autarky means that home labor loses for sure. Foreign 
likewise may be thought of as having returned to a type of autarky, but it is an autarky 
with the superior home technology, so that foreign labor experiences substantial gains 
from migration. Again, migration shifts out world production possibilities and with 
perfect factor markets raises world income. But, relative to the trading equilibrium, more 
than all of the incremental world income from migration accrues to foreign labor. Home 
labor loses.8 
 
III. Non-Homogeneous Labor 
 The foregoing has assumed that home and foreign labor are identical provided 
they have access to the same nation-specific technology. However, we know that in the 
United States, immigrant labor has neither the same geographical nor occupational 
                                                 
8 These results have been developed within the context of the Dornbusch-Fischer-Samuelson model, with 
its restrictive assumptions on demand, the existence of a continuum of goods, and that the degree of 
comparative advantage is itself continuous. These assumptions are convenient for the transparency of the 
analysis. However, by analogy with the results developed here, it would be straightforward to demonstrate 
that none of these restrictions is necessary. 
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distribution as natives.9 Moreover, immigrants on average do not earn as much as natives 
when controlling for other relevant characteristics. Since the empirical exercises to follow 
must confront these non-homogeneities, we need an analytic framework to determine an 
appropriate way to do so. 
 The essential analytic points can be set out in a very simple framework. For this 
exercise, let FL  be the equilibrium quantity of foreign labor that enters the home 
economy. Let ( ) 1zϕ ≤  be the productivity of foreign labor relative to home labor when it 
has access to the home technology. In other words, allow for the possibility that foreign 
labor is less productive than home labor at producing a good z even when it has access to 
the home technology. Hence, for foreign labor employed in the home country,  
(15) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )Fy z z A z L zϕ=   
Output for home labor remains as in Equation (2).  
 For simplicity, divide the goods produced in the home country into two groups 
 and Z Z+ − distinguished by the relative productivity of foreign labor, where ( )zϕ  is 
assumed constant within each group and ( ) ( ) if  and z z z Z z Zϕ ϕ + −′ ′> ∈ ∈ . For the 
moment, we can simplify further by assuming ( ) 1zϕ =  for z Z +∈  (so home and foreign 
labor are equally productive in these goods).  
For our purposes, the interesting case to consider is one in which, in equilibrium, 
home labor is active in producing both types of goods. In this case, immigrant labor will 
                                                 
9 In what follows we ignore the issue of the geographical concentration of immigrant labor. However, we 
will note that an extensive discussion among labor economists has already considered the importance of 
this, noting that the opportunities of other potential internal migrants to alter plans and of producers to shift 
production mix to adjust to international migrant settlement patterns suggests that the geographical impact 
may be quite limited. This seems sensible in an appropriate long run. Borjas (1994, p. 1700) notes that the 
puzzling fact is that this equilibration in the case of international migrants seems to happen extremely 
rapidly. 
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be active only in producing Z + -type goods, since the wage on offer to it there will be 
equivalent to the native wage while it would be lower were they to be employed in Z − -
type goods.  
 This case has two features that are especially important for us. First, immigrant 
labor is concentrated, producing only Z + -type goods. Second, this concentration is 
wholly inconsequential for the equilibrium of the real economy. Since wages of native 
and immigrant labor are already equalized, there would be no incentive for either type to 
change sectors even if there were no productivity gap in the remaining goods. In this type 
of equilibrium, in which native labor remains active in all sectors and immigrant labor 
only in some, one can treat the two as identical even if there are productivity differences 
that prevent the immigrant labor from moving into other sectors. 
 This can be readily extended to the case in which home labor has a productivity 
advantage in both types of goods. In that case, ( ) 1zϕ <  for z Z +∈ . So long as the 
productivity gap remains smaller in Z + -type goods and native labor remains active in 
both sectors, immigrant labor will be concentrated in the Z + -type goods. Changes in 
immigrant labor that do not shift us from this equilibrium can be treated as if each 
immigrant delivers ( )zϕ  units of labor when measured in native equivalents. This 
rationalizes a world in which immigrant labor is concentrated by productive sector and in 
which there exists a wage gap between immigrants and natives. Nonetheless, it says that 
we can treat immigrant and native labor as equivalents provided we make the appropriate 




IV. The US Productivity Advantage and Factor Inflows 
 The empirical segment of this paper has two objectives. The first is to establish on 
a prior basis the reasonableness of our use of the Ricardian model as a framework for 
analyzing factor inflows to the US economy. The second is then to use this framework, 
and simple variants, to calculate the impact of these flows on the US. 
 The Ricardian framework is special in two dimensions. The first is that 
technological differences are the foundation for observed factor flows. The second is that 
the Ricardian model relies on a single composite factor “labor”. For this to be a 
reasonable framework for our exercise, we would like to verify the plausibility of these 
assumptions. For the first, we would like to confirm that the US has productivity 
advantages that could be the origin of these flows. For the analytics based on a composite 
factor, we would like to see that the entry patterns to the US of mobile factors are at least 
broadly similar across different types of factors. Measuring these factor inflows will also 
then serve as an input to our calculation of the impact on the US. 
 
A. US Productivity Advantages 
 The US enjoys a large productivity advantage over virtually all other countries in 
the world.  Table 1 presents estimates from Islam (1995 and 2001) of total factor 
productivity (TFP) for a large sample of countries. As the data reveal, many developing 
countries have TFP levels less than 20 percent of the US level.  In some extreme cases, 
productivity in developing countries is less than 5 percent that of the US. In these data 
only Hong Kong and Canada have TFP levels higher than that of the US.  While there is 
a rich TFP literature that has produced a variety of point estimates for individual 
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countries [see e.g. recent work by Hall and Jones (1996)], all studies conclude that TFP in 
the US is among the highest in the world.10  
 Hendricks (2002) provides an alternative approach that arrives at a similar 
conclusion. He draws on observations of the earnings of immigrants to the US from 
various countries as one input in a decomposition of the sources of cross-country income 
differences. If differences in the quality of human capital were to explain the vast cross-
country differences in income, then there would need to be very large gaps in wages 
between immigrants and US natives – of a magnitude that we do not observe. He 
concludes that to make sense of the much smaller actual gaps, even after accounting for 
other cross-country differences, one must rely on large differences in TFP – precisely the 
mechanism that we rely on in this paper as the motivation for factor migration. 
  
B. Contribution of Immigration to the US Labor Force 
The US census provides the most accurate numbers on the percent of the US labor 
force that was born abroad.  The Census Bureau tries hard to make adjustments for 
undercounting of illegal immigrants.  The Census Bureau reports that the proportion of 
foreign born as a share of the US population in 1998 was 9.8 percent [OECD (2001)].   
As it turns out, the contribution of the foreign born to the US labor force is even greater 
than its contribution to US population because immigrants have higher labor force 
participation rates than natives.  As a result, in 1998 fully 11.7 percent of the US labor 
                                                 
10 While differences in aggregate TFP suffice to establish a motive for migration and would be fully 
adequate to the story we tell here, trade according to comparative advantage requires as well that there be 
variation at the product level in the TFP gap. The best existing evidence is the work of Jorgenson and 
various co-authors, as for example in Jorgenson and Kuroda (1990), which shows substantial variation in 
relative TFP at the industry level even for relatively rich countries. Moreover, Harrigan (1997) shows that 
this industry variation in TFP also affects patterns of international specialization. 
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force was comprised of people born outside of the US. This is the point estimate that we 
will use throughout the remainder of the paper. 
 Although census data are superior to INS (2002) data in terms of understanding 
what share of the US labor force comes from abroad, INS data are useful in 
understanding the timing and sources of immigrant inflows.11  The US immigrant 
population is largely the result of a dramatic increase in immigration to the US in recent 
decades.  As we can see from Table 2, legal immigration rose from approximately 
250,000 per year in the 1950’s to close to one million per year in recent decades. In 
addition to the large absolute inflows, immigrants have accounted for an increasing share 
of US population growth.  Between 1950 and 1998, the US population rose 
approximately 80 percent, growing from 152 million to 271 million.  Using legal flows of 
immigrants as a proxy for net flows, the share of migrants in US population growth rose 
from approximately 9 percent in the 1950’s to around 37 percent since 1980.  Much of 
this reflects the fact that legal immigrant inflows as a share of the existing population 
rose from around 0.1 percent to 0.3 percent per year. This, coupled with declining fertility 
in the native population, accounts for the growing relative importance of immigration in 
US population growth.   
 A second striking feature of the INS data is the sources of immigration.  Only 5.5 
percent of the legal immigrants to the US in 1999 came from countries whose TFP as 
measured by Islam (2001) was at least 70 percent as high as that of the US.  Moreover, 
                                                 
11 One must be careful in comparing the INS data with the census data because gross legal immigrant 
inflows into the US are not the same thing as net flows of immigrants.  The INS identifies two main sources 
of error.  First the census bureau estimates that in the 1990’s approximately 220,000 foreign-born residents 
and 48,000 native-born residents emigrated from the US each year.  On the other hand, the INS estimates 
that 275,000 entered the US illegally each year.  Surprisingly, these numbers are quite similar, suggesting 
net inflows in the last decade were quite similar in magnitude to the level of legal immigration.   
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over half of the legal immigrants to the US between 1991 and 1995 came from the 
Caribbean, Central and South America – countries with typically less than one-third the 
US TFP level. Other major source countries, such as the Philippines, the Soviet Union, 
China, India, and Vietnam, have low TFP levels as well. 
Taken together, the data reveal that immigration from countries with low TFP 
levels account for the vast majority of immigration into the US.  Moreover, this 
immigration from low TFP countries accounts for a substantial share of the growth in the 
US population and labor supply. These facts underscore the Ricardian motivations for 
migration. 
 
C. Composition of Immigrants to the US 
 The foregoing has considered the contribution of the foreign born to the US labor 
force, yet it has not taken account of possible differences in the skill composition of 
native and foreign born workers. Until 1994, the Current Population Survey contained a 
question regarding whether or not a worker was born abroad. Based on this, it is possible 
to examine differences between native and foreign-born educational attainment (see 
Table 3).  The CPS data indicate that immigrants have lower levels of educational 
attainment. But the differences are not as substantial as one might think. In 1994, 29 
percent of foreign-born workers had at least a college degree (16 or more years of 
education) while 32 percent of US born workers did.  At the high skill end, there is a gap, 
but it is small.  
 There is a greater difference between immigrants and natives among the lower 
tiers of educational attainment.  While 33 percent of immigrants had less than 12 years of 
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education only 13 percent of native-born people did.  This suggests the influx of 
immigrants is likely to have its biggest relative impact on the factor supply of low skilled 
workers in the US.   
 
D. Contribution of Net Capital Inflows to the US Capital Stock 
 Factor inflows to the United States have not been limited to labor. In recent 
decades, the US has experienced large and persistent net capital inflows. These capital 
inflows have assumed an important and growing role as a share of US gross capital 
formation. Figure 4 reveals that while there was a small capital outflow from the US in 
the 1970’s, this was reversed in the early eighties. Indeed, for the last two decades, net 
foreign capital inflows financed between 5 and 21 percent of US gross capital 
formation.12   
 We would like to emphasize that in making this calculation we do not mean to 
imply that technological advantage is the sole determinant of net capital flows. Rather, 
we look on national technological advantage as one determinant of the level of 
investment, which along with other determinants of saving and investment works through 
the national income accounting to determine the net capital flows. Here we are able only 
to calculate the impact of actual inflows, not to separate the motivations for these inflows. 
This notwithstanding, we believe that national technological advantage, per the 
discussion above, is almost certainly an important component in the joint determination 
of these net flows.  
                                                 
12 Indeed, by the year 2000 these net capital inflows accounted for one-fourth of US gross capital 
formation. 
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 We can obtain some sense of the importance of these net flows by looking at how 
much of the US capital stock has been financed from abroad.  Capital in year t can be 
defined as 
(16)     ( ) 1/ 1t t t tK I P Kδ −= + −   
where Kt is the capital stock, It is gross fixed capital formation, Pt is the price of capital 
equipment and δ is the deprecation rate.  
We define a counterfactual domestically financed capital stock in year t as, 
(17)    ( ) ( ) 1/ 1d dt t t t tK I NK P Kδ −= − + −  
where NKt is the net flow of capital into the US.  dtK can be either larger or smaller than 
the actual capital stock depending on the sign of NKt.  If it is smaller, then it represents 
the amount of capital that was financed by domestic savers.  If it is larger, then it 
represents how much the US capital stock would have been if net flows of investment 
funds had not flowed out of the US but rather had been invested domestically.   
Finally, we define the foreign financed capital stock as  
(18)     f dt t tK K K≡ − . 
 Implicitly, this decomposition of the actual capital stock into foreign and domestic 
components assumes that the path of domestically financed investments would have been 
no different had the US closed its borders to capital inflows. To go beyond this requires a 
model of this counterfactual, an exercise we do not perform in this paper. Here we 
assume that domestic investment is unaffected by net foreign capital inflows and view 
our calculations as a benchmark.   
Using data on investment and the price of capital goods from the IMF, we set the 
capital stock in 1947 equal to zero and calculate the US capital stock using the same 
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depreciation rate (13.3 percent) as in Bowen, Leamer and Sveikauskas (1987) and 
Harrigan (1997).  We then set the domestic capital stock in 1970 equal to our estimate of 
the US capital stock in that year and calculate the domestic capital stock according to 
equation (17) and the foreign capital stock according to equation (18).  This procedure 
yields an estimate of the foreign-financed capital stock in 1998 equal to 11.8 percent of 
the total US capital stock.  
 
E. Reasonableness of the Ricardian Framework 
We stated two criteria at the outset for the reasonableness of our use of the 
Ricardian framework for examining the consequences of the inflow of factors to the US 
economy. The first criterion is that the US has a productivity advantage that is plausibly a 
motivation for these factor movements. We saw that this is strongly confirmed by the 
evidence above on US TFP advantages, which are particularly strong relative to countries 
that are the main sources for immigration to the US. The second criterion is that it is 
plausible to treat the factor inflows as if they were a composite factor as per the Ricardian 
model. This in turn requires that the magnitude of the inflows across factors not have 
been too different. We saw above that the contribution of the foreign born as a share of 
the US labor force is 11.7 percent. Under our assumptions, this number is strikingly close 
to the 11.8 percent estimate of the share of the US capital stock financed by net inflows 
of foreign capital.  
If this were the whole story, then our treatment of the factors as a composite 
would be strongly confirmed. Of course, we also saw that when we disaggregate labor 
into different types, there are some differences in composition, especially among the least 
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skilled. We will address this issue of composition more directly below when we turn to a 
multi-sector account of the impact of these factor flows on output composition and our 
terms of trade. Nonetheless, the fact that, in broad terms, the inflows of capital and labor 
are so similar in magnitude seems to us strong reason for taking seriously our Ricardian 
approach to the consequences of factor inflows as an alternative to the standard approach, 
which considers inflows only of one factor at a time.  
 
V. How Factor Migration Affects the Income of US Natives 
In this section we calculate the impact of these factor inflows on the US economy. 
In principle, we could generate as many estimates of this impact as there are potential 
models of the US and world economies. Our core results are developed in two steps. The 
first step focuses purely on the rise of the US scale in the world economy due to 
immigration and is closest to the macroeconomic literature, as exemplified by Acemoglu 
and Ventura (2002). The second step supplements this by allowing for greater 
heterogeneity in labor inflows and output composition, and is closer to the international 





                                                 
13 The simulations we develop are in the same analytic spirit as those of Borjas, Freeman, and Katz (1997). 
Borjas (1999, p. 48) argues in support of this approach, noting that “although the factor proportions 
approach relies on theory, so must any applied economic analysis that wishes to do more than simply 
calculate correlations. In the end, any interpretation of economic data—and particularly any use of these 
data to predict the outcomes of shifts in immigration policy—requires a ‘story’.” 
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A. Macroeconomic Approach 
A first step in estimating the impact of factor migration to the US would merge a 
simple variant of our Ricardian model above with the AK approach of Acemoglu and 
Ventura (2002). We can simplify our Ricardian model so that there is a single good 
produced in each of the US and the rest of the world, but which differ from one another.14 
As in both our model and that of Acemoglu and Ventura, we will think of only a single 
composite factor (“capital” for them, “labor” for us). The US technological advantage 
then gives rise to factor movements that raise output of the US good and contract output 
of the good produced in the rest of the world. This shift in relative outputs then will have 
terms of trade effects and we will use the elasticities estimated in Acemoglu and Ventura 
to evaluate these. 
As noted earlier, our treatment of the factor inflows as a composite is motivated 
by the fact that the contribution of foreign labor inflows to the US labor force and the 
contribution of foreign net capital inflows to the US capital stock come in at almost the 
same level (11.7 vs. 11.8 percent). If we multiply the US labor share by 11.7 percent and 
the capital share by 11.8 percent, then, we will then translate this into an equivalent 
proportional increase of 11.8 percent in output of the US good.  
At initial prices, this would translate into an equivalent proportion excess supply 
of US goods in world markets. Adjustment will occur through a deterioration in the US 
terms of trade. For our calculation, we will use the preferred estimate from Acemoglu and 
Ventura, in which the elasticity of the terms of trade with respect to GDP is –0.60. The 
                                                 
14 The central results we developed above in Section II are robust to a restriction that the margin of goods 
produced in each country does not change, as we assume here. Unfortunately, the empirical researcher does 
not directly observe a change in the margin of goods produced, as the theoretical model of Section II would 
require. No doubt, some of this change in the margin may be captured by the changing composition of 
output considered in Section V.B. below. 
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consequent deterioration in the US terms of trade as a result of the growth implied by 
these factor inflows is then –7.0 percent.  
Before we can calculate the cost to the US economy of this, we need to resolve an 
ambiguity here. Whether the change in the terms of trade comes through a decline of 
export prices or a rise in import prices would be immaterial if trade were balanced. 
However, since the IMF reports that exports were 8 percent and imports 11 percent of US 
GDP, this could make a difference. Our approach is simply to split the difference, 
assuming that the change in the terms of trade comes half in the form of a fall in US 
export prices and half in the form of a rise in US import prices.  
Hence our calculation of the lost income via the terms of trade deterioration is of 
the form:  
(19) TGDP 1   *
GDP 2 GDP
M Eε∆  +              
where the first term in parentheses is the change in GDP due to factor inflows, εT is the 
Acemoglu-Ventura estimate of how much GDP growth causes the terms of trade to 
deteriorate, M is imports and E is exports.  This yields an impact in 1998 of 0.7 percent of 
US GDP or $58.4 billion dollars. 
 So far, we have focused on the consequences of the expansion of US output due 
to these factor flows. However, we also need to recognize that their movement leads to a 
contraction of output of the rest of the world, making foreign output scarcer relative to 
US output, causing additional deterioration in the US terms of trade. These incremental 
effects are likely to be smaller than those calculated above at least in part because of the 
lower productivity of factors in the rest of the world. Of the 28 million foreign-born 
residents of the US, only 16 million are actually in the labor force.  Given that the World 
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Bank (1999 WDR) puts the global labor force outside of the US at 2.6 billion workers, 
this probably only represents a 0.6 percent decline in the number of available workers.  In 
terms of capital we get slightly larger effects.  Davis and Weinstein (2002) estimate that 
23 percent of the world’s capital stock is in the US. Since 11.8 percent of the US capital 
stock was financed from abroad, the flows imply a 3.5 percent reduction in the capital 
stock of the rest of the world. 
Multiplying these numbers by the US labor and capital shares, we estimate that 
factor flows from the rest of the world to the US decreased output in the ROW by 1.9 
percent.  This implies an additional deterioration in the US terms of trade of 1.1 percent, 
which would cost the US an additional 9.2 billion dollars.  Taken together this first step 
in our exercise generates a net income loss to the US from factor migration of 68 billion 
dollars in 1998 or 0.8 percent of US GDP in that year. 
 
B. Heterogeneous Labor in Multi-Sector Model Approach 
 We now supplement this macro approach with elements focused on composition 
effects. There are two key departures. The first is that we disaggregate our labor variable 
according to skill class. The second is that we move to a multi-sector model of the US 
economy. These departures allow us to develop a simple model that builds on Harrigan 
(1997) to describe the impact on the US net offer to the rest of the world at the initial 
prices. We then apply terms of trade elasticities at a sectoral level, which we draw from 
Deardorff and Stern (1986). Again these will allow us to calculate the impact on US 
incomes of the immigration of these factors, now taking account both of scale and 
composition effects. 
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 In this exercise, we disaggregate the labor force into three classes, those with a 
college degree, high school graduates, and high school dropouts. As we noted earlier, the 
proportion of foreign born in the high educational bracket mirrors reasonably closely that 
proportion in the native population. However, this is less true at lower educational levels, 
where natives are more likely to have completed high school and the foreign born to have 
dropped out. These differences are at least potentially important in our framework 
because in a multi-sector model they will have a non-uniform effect on the composition 
of output. In principle this could even improve the US terms of trade if the composition 
works to principally expand import-competing sectors. By using a multi-sector model and 
employing the estimates of Harrigan (1997), we can take direct account of these output 
composition effects. Finally, the multi-sector model also allows us to move away from 
applying a single terms of trade elasticity for composite exports, but rather to allow for 
different elasticities by sector.  
 We now discuss our implementation. Let iT  be net trade, iX  be output and iD  be 
absorption in sector i. Then,  
(20) i i iT X D= −   
i.e. our net offer is just output less absorption in that sector. We now need to see how that 
net offer will change at the initial prices if a non-uniform inflow of factors changes 
sectoral output, GDP, and absorption. For simplicity, we assume that absorption is 
homothetic, so that at initial prices, the inflow of factors affects the scale of absorption, 
but not its composition. Keeping in mind that we are looking at discrete changes, we need 




≡  be defined to be the ratio of 
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output in sector i to GDP, and a circumflex, ^, represent a proportional change. In 
Appendix A, we show that the change can be examined as follows: 
(21) n nˆ ˆi i i i i iT X s T GDP X s GDP∆ = + +   
This differenced equation has three terms. The first is a Composition Effect – reflecting 
the fact that even at the original GDP, there is a change in the share of output in sector i. 
The second is a Size Effect – reflecting the fact that even if the inflow of factors had no 
impact on the composition of output, the simple scaling-up in the magnitude of output 
and absorption would raise our net offer. Finally, because of the discrete changes, there is 
also an interaction between the scale and composition changes that need not be small. 
 The starting point for the empirical implementation of this equation is the 
excellent work of Harrigan (1997).  Harrigan builds a full general equilibrium Heckscher-
Ohlin-Ricardo model of global production and then obtains precise estimates of the 
effects of productivity and endowments on the production of the various manufacturing 
sectors.  The parameter estimates that Harrigan derives are exactly what we need in order 
to understand how changes in capital and low, medium, and high-skill labor will affect 
US exports.  
Harrigan’s point estimates tell us how much a given percentage change in a 
particular factor will change the value-added share of a particular sector in GDP.  By 
multiplying Harrigan’s coefficient estimates (from Table 5 of his paper) by the changes 
in US factor supplies implied by migration, we obtain estimates for how much each 
sector’s value added share of GDP should change as a result of migration. The only 
remaining issue is that trade is the difference between production and absorption, not 
value added and absorption. We will assume that the percentage change in a sector’s 
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share of value added is the same as its percentage change in output. Thus, we can use 
Harrigan’s coefficients to calculate iˆs  and so to implement the model of the change in the 
US net offer embodied in equation (21).15 Since the last CPS data on the composition of 
foreign-born workers is from 1994, we will have to assume that this did not change 
appreciably by 1998. Performing this calculation for the US reveals that the inflows of 
factors into the US caused the biggest expansions in US net offers in processed food, 
apparel, and industrial machinery and contractions in paper, chemicals, and metals. We 
then calculate ∆Ti by summing the various terms of equation (21).  
 Assessing the impacts of these changes in net offers on prices requires some 
additional assumptions and modeling. ∆Ti must be accommodated by adjustments in the 
prices of exports and imports.  We model this as follows.  Assume that price changes in 










ε∆ ∆=  
where Ei and Mi are US exports and imports in sector i,  ( )E Mi iε ε  is the elasticity of US 
exports (imports), and pi is the relative price of US to foreign goods in the sector.16  We 
can then write the impact of a change in the US net offer on prices as, 
(24) ( )E M ii i i i i i i
i
pT E M E M
p
ε ε ∆∆ = ∆ −∆ = −  
                                                 
15 In calculating the terms of trade changes, we are limited to using the sectors employed by Harrigan. This 
is less than the full universe of sectors (cf. Harrigan 1997). Implicitly we are obliged to assume that terms 
of trade effects in excluded sectors match the average for included sectors.  
16 US Import demand elasticities were taken from Table 3.2 pp. 42-43 of Deardorff and Stern (1986).  US 
export elasticities were based on Table 3.2 and recalculated according to Deardorff and Stern's 
methodology (equations A.1.25 and A.1.32) with 1994 data. 
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or  
(25) ( )i iE M ii i i i
T p
pE Mε ε
∆ ∆=−  
Equation (25) gives us a mapping between changes in net offers and changes in US 
export prices.  Using data on sectoral export and import elasticities taken from Deardorff 
and Stern (1986) we can estimate the impact of these changes in net offers on prices.  
Once again we are faced with the ambiguity of whether a certain percentage change in 
the relative price of US exports is due to export or import prices changes.  Here again we 
assume that half of the change is due to export price movements and half due to import 
price movements.  We calculate the change in the terms of trade as 






∆  = +  ∑  
where E and M denote aggregate US exports and imports. Using equation (26), we find 
that factor composition effects imply that the US terms of trade deteriorated by an 
additional 1.5%.  This implies an additional loss for the US of 12.5 billion dollars, which 
brings the aggregate income loss up to 80 billion or 0.9 percent of GDP.17  
 
C. Magnitude of Losses 
We have now provided an approach to calculating the impact of migration on the 
income of US natives in two steps. The first step focuses on pure scale effects in a world 
in which US output is a function of the capital stock and aggregate labor and then applies 
the trade elasticity estimates of Acemoglu and Ventura (2002). The second step 
                                                 
17 Ideally, we would like to have calculated the impact of changing factor ratios on output in the rest of the 
world.  Unfortunately, we don’t have consistent data on value added by industry that matched the export 
data, so we did not do this calculation.   
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supplements this by considering a world in which output is divided into multiple 
industries and labor is disaggregated according to educational attainment. The impact of 
factors on output levels and composition is based on Harrigan (1997) and the sectoral 
trade elasticities are drawn from Deardorff and Stern (1986). It is worth noting that the 
latter experiment, in which some sectors expand and others contract in relative terms, 
could in principle have led to improvements in the US terms of trade. 
The results from these experiments suggest that the resulting terms of trade losses 
are approximately $80 billion in 1998. Of this, approximately 90 percent of the loss 
would be borne by US natives, for total income losses from migration of approximately 
$72  billion in the same year. These represent losses of approximately 0.8 percent of GDP 
annually. 
These are big numbers. These losses to US natives from factor immigration are 
approximately equivalent to Feenstra’s (1992) estimate of the annual deadweight loss to 
the US from all trade protection. It is approximately two to three times Alvarez and 
Jermann’s (2000) estimate of the average annual cost of business cycles to consumers in 
the postwar period.18 In other words, immigration (labor and capital together) is about as 
costly to the US as all trade protection and two to three times as costly as business cycles!   
 
D. Robustness of Estimates 
This paper asks us to re-think conventions of estimating the impact of factor 
migration on the incomes of US natives. And it concludes that the impact is large and 
negative. Inevitably, to make such calculations, one is obliged to make important 
                                                 
18 It’s also worth noting that a main point of the Alvarez and Jermann paper is that they find large costs of 
the business cycle relative to the calculations of Lucas (1987). 
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assumptions about the appropriate underlying model. And it is equally inevitable that we 
should want to think hard about how reasonable those assumptions are and if sensible 
changes would affect the conclusions in an important way.  
One key assumption is that the US economy as a whole displays constant returns 
to scale. If instead it displayed increasing returns in the aggregate, then the conclusions 
might be attenuated or even reversed. Some early work has argued that there may be 
aggregate increasing returns, as in Domowitz, Hubbard and Petersen (1988) and Hall 
(1990).  However, Basu and Fernald (1997) have argued that standard approaches of 
estimating aggregate increasing returns are severely biased upwards.  The reason is 
simple.  If sectors that experience positive productivity shocks also expand output, then 
there will be a positive correlation between productivity and the size of sectors in an 
economy.  Using US data, Basu and Fernald show that although the aggregate data may 
appear to exhibit increasing returns, this is simply an artifact of the aggregation bias.  
Most industries in the US seem to exhibit constant or even decreasing returns.  Similarly, 
using plant level data Baily, Hulten, and Campbell (1992) found that most plants 
operated using constant returns to scale technology. Based on these results, we think that 
the baseline assumption of aggregate constant returns to scale is reasonable.    
One can turn the question around and ask how big one needs to believe increasing 
returns need to be in order to offset the terms of trade effect.  The Acemoglu and Ventura 
estimate coupled with the importance of trade in the US suggests that elasticity of per 
capita income with respect to size is -0.057.  However, given that our previous estimate 
based on actual factor migration suggested that an 11.8 percent increase in the US 
implied a 1.9 percent contraction in the rest of the world, we estimate that the elasticity of 
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output with respect to size must be in excess of 1.07 in order for factor migration not to 
lower the income of US natives.  
 A second issue is whether there is something unique about immigration that 
selects for those who contribute unusually to a society and its economy. We don’t have a 
final answer. There is no doubt that some immigrants to the US have contributed 
enormously to particular fields (e.g. economics) and industries (e.g. high tech in Silicon 
Valley). It is less clear what would have happened in the counterfactual. We would 
simply note that Borjas (1999, pp. 96-98) is skeptical, arguing there is “no empirical 
evidence” that the contributions of immigrants are outsize to their numbers.19 
A third issue is that so far we have been treating immigrant labor as identical to 
domestic labor.  It is worth revisiting this in a manner suggested by our model of Section 
III.  Immigrants typically earn less than domestic workers of similar educational levels.  
If this reflects differences in productivity, say due to immigrants’ poor English ability, 
then they will not replace native-born workers one for one.  One reasonable 
approximation for how much less productive immigrants are is given by the differential 
between the wages paid to immigrants and the wages paid to native born workers after 
controlling for education, age, and region of employment.  Borjas (1995) estimates this 
gap to be 10 percent in 1990.  Indeed, if we assume that one immigrant generates only 90 
percent of the output of a native-born worker, the welfare loss for natives falls from 72 
billion dollars to 68 billion dollars when we control for both aggregate and sectoral 
effects, and less if we think that immigrants into the US are higher quality than the 
                                                 
19 Indeed, one of the classic contributions of Borjas (1985) was to challenge the results of Chiswick (1978). 
Chiswick, examining a cross section, concluded not only that immigrants closed the wage gap with natives 
but actually overtook them, with the supposed explanation being selection for unusually clever immigrants 
from among the foreign born. Borjas showed that such results in the cross section would appear even 
without any convergence if there were declining average quality of cohorts, a feature of the US time series. 
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average worker in the rest of the world.  We therefore conclude that adjustments for 
unobserved immigrant quality are likely to have only small impacts on our point 
estimates.   
 
VI. Conclusions 
 This paper provides an alternative to the conventional account of the immigration 
of factors to the United States and their impact on native incomes. In the conventional 
account, such migration is considered one factor at a time holding all others fixed. While 
the reasons for migration are not always fully articulated, usually the implicit assumption 
is that it is a story of relative scarcity of factors, as in simple non-Factor Price 
Equalization versions of the Heckscher-Ohlin trade model. In this conventional model, 
the movement of productive factors raises world income and these income gains are 
shared between natives of both source and recipient countries. In effect, the conventional 
account holds that there are mutual gains from migration very much in parallel to the 
conventional gains from trade.  
We instead argue for applying a Ricardian framework, in which factor migration 
is motivated by the technological superiority of the United States. Such a model has 
important positive and normative differences. It implies that all factors should seek to 
enter the country with a technological advantage. Indeed, we observe that low-skill labor, 
high-skill labor, and capital all have important inflows to the United States. While, as in 
the conventional model, the flow of factors raises world income, there is nonetheless a 
strong contrast. Instead of these gains accruing in part to natives of both countries, here 
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more than all of the gains accrue to natives of the source country. Natives of the United 
States, as recipient country, suffer income losses.  
 We also develop a baseline empirical exercise that quantifies these losses in two 
steps. The first step focuses on a one-sector macro model with nationally differentiated 
products that may be thought of as a melding of a simple Ricardian model with the world 
AK trade model of Acemoglu and Ventura (2002). The second enriches this by 
disaggregating both labor and product types, allowing the factor flows to affect not only 
the level but also the composition of production and trade. The empirical exercise implies 
that the combination of labor immigration and net capital inflows is very costly for US 
native incomes. In 1998, these losses would have been approximately $72 billion. This is 
roughly equivalent to Feenstra’s (1992) calculation of losses from all US protection or 
two to three times what Alvarez and Jermann (2000) calculate as the per annum cost of 
the US business cycle. 
 It is both natural and important that this paper stress the novel elements of our 
analysis – in particular the result that US natives may lose a great deal of income from 
these factor flows. However, it is likewise important to stress some cautions in applying 
this analysis and indicate some directions in which additional research is warranted. First, 
as in the conventional model, the flow of factors here enhances world efficiency. In 
principle, were it feasible and desirable, lump sum redistribution could yield Pareto gains. 
Even if such redistribution is not undertaken, factor migration provides first order gains 
both to migrating factors and to those that remain in the source country (the latter via 
improved terms of trade) – gains which may far exceed the cost to US natives. In this 
respect, it may be looked on as a contribution to world welfare of the openness of the US 
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to factor migration. Second, our focus on the impact on native incomes naturally cannot 
take any account of benefits that may accrue to a society from living in an environment 
enriched by immigrants in ways not mediated by the market. Third, it is worth examining 
more closely the contributions of immigrants particularly to knowledge-intensive sectors, 
whether in Silicon Valley or the halls of academia, to identify contributions to income 
that may surpass those identified in this paper. Finally, one may in principle identify a 
large number of other contributions by immigrants. Follow-on work should aim to 
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Country Level Total Factor Productivity (US =100) 
Country Index     
Africa  Asia  Americas  
  Algeria 18.64   Bangladesh 13.27   Argentina 25.92 
  Angola 13.27   Burma 8.63   Bolivia 16.86 
  Benin 7.07   Hong Kong 153.73   Brazil 41.90 
  Botswana 20.39   India 7.07   Canada 104.08 
  Burundi 6.46   Israel 61.88   Chile 22.54 
  Cameroon 16.04   Japan 78.66   Colombia 28.65 
  Central African Republic 5.56   Jordan 25.92   Costa Rica 38.29 
  Chad 4.20   South Korea 38.29   Dominican Republic 21.44 
  Congo 12.00   Malaysia 38.29   Ecuador 23.69 
  Egypt 15.26   Nepal 12.00   El Salvador 24.66 
  Ethiopia 7.81   Pakistan 19.40   Guatemala 31.35 
  Ghana 5.34   Philippines 18.64   Haiti 11.42 
  Ivory Coast 16.86   Singapore 86.07   Honduras 12.62 
  Kenya 7.07   Sri Lanka 15.26   Jamaica 16.86 
  Liberia 5.84   Syria 46.30   Mexico 48.68 
  Madagascar 8.63   Thailand 24.66   Nicaragua 30.12 
  Malawi 5.84 Europe    Panama 28.65 
  Mali 5.56   Austria 67.71   Paraguay 32.96 
  Mauritania 4.60   Belgium 78.66   Peru 32.96 
  Mauritius 18.64   Denmark 74.83   Trinidad 61.88 
  Morocco 31.35   Finland 50.66   Uruguay 38.29 
  Mozambique 12.00   France 78.66   United States 100.00 
  Niger 7.81   Germany 67.71   Venezuela 53.26 
  Nigeria 8.98   Greece 38.29 Australia and Other  
  Rwanda 6.46   Ireland 38.29   Australia 58.86 
  Senegal 10.97   Italy 58.86   New Zealand 58.86 
  Sierra Leone 7.43   Netherlands 71.18   Papua New Guinea 17.73 
  Somalia 3.62   Norway 86.07   
  South Africa 38.29   Portugal 34.65   
  Sudan 6.14   Spain 78.66   
  Tanzania 4.37   Sweden 71.18   
  Togo 7.07   Switzerland 61.88   
  Tunisia 27.25   Turkey 27.25   
  Uganda 10.44   United Kingdom 71.18   
  Zaire 4.37     
  Zambia 4.20     





Capital and Legal immigrant inflows into the US 
 
 
Average Number of 
Legal Immigrants per 
Year 
Percent of Population 
Growth Due to 
Immigration 
Average Annual Net 
Capital Inflows As a 




1950-1959 249,927 9%  
 
1960-1969 321,365 14%  
 
1970-1979 423,232 21% -0.76% 
 
1980-1991 807,989 38% 6.84% 
 
1992-1998 825,414 36% 12.81% 
 
Source: INS and IMF.  We include 1990 and 1991 in the decade with the 1980’s because 
an amnesty program produced very large recorded immigration inflows in the late 1980’s 





Educational Attainment of the Labor Force in 1994 by Place of Birth in 
Percent 
 
 Less than 12 Years 
of Education 
12-15 Years of 
Education 
16 or more years of 
Education 
 
Foreign Born 33.2 38.0 28.8 
 
Native Born 12.5 55.4 32.0 
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In this appendix we show how we derived equation (21).  If we express equation (20) in 
changes, we obtain 
(27) i i iT X D∆ = ∆ −∆  
If we make the standard assumption of homothetic preferences, we have 
(28) ni i iGDPD D D GDPGDP
∆∆ = =  
where a circumflex indicates a percentage change. We can also decompose the change of 
output according to the following formula: 
(29) i i i ii i
X X X XX GDP X GDP GDP GDP
GDP GDP GDP GDP
   = ⇒ ∆ = ∆ + ∆ + ∆ ∆        
where the last term would be zero if the changes were not discrete.  After a little 






i i i iX X
GDP GDP
GDP GDPX X X X
GDP GDP
   ∆ ∆∆ ∆∆ = + +      
  
or 
(31) n nˆ ˆi i i i i iX X s X GDP X s GDP∆ = + +  
 
Inserting equations (28) and (31) into equation (27) and rearranging terms produces 
equation (21) in the text: 
 n nˆ ˆi i i i i iT X s T GDP X s GDP∆ = + +  
 
